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Abstract
Growing aging population with the low fertility has brought a severe picture to maintain
the pension scheme in near future. The nancial viability of public pension requires the
reserve should be positive to pay the benet in the demographic and economical environment
change subject to maintain the certain level of the income replacement ratio. The two-tier
public pension has a scheme which consists of constant and wage-proportional benet and
premium. The policy depends only four variables of premium and benet for two schemes
but the diculty exits in the long time decision for life span and the economic equality of
various cohorts in the uncertain future environment,
Assuming the price of market asset and the average wage follow stochastic processes, we
maximize the net present value of pension for the cohort. To guarantee the pension fund
viability, we obtain conditions by the martingale method of the optimal consumption and
investment theory. For the pension population change, we consider the condition for various
cohorts to equalized the net present value of cost benet in the two-tier pension system.
Keywords: two-tier public pension, portfolio risk management, population cohort
1 Introduction
Japanese government has started two-tier pension system since 1986. The rst-tier is called Na-
tional Pension (NP) where all residents aged 20-59 contribute a constant premium compulsorily.
The second-tier is called wage-Proportional Pension (PP) where the employer pays the half of
the premium. The benet of pension also are separated as 2-tier; one is called Basic pension
which are equally payed to all including dependent spouses of wage-proportional pensioners,
who did not pay explicitly any contribution. The benet of wage-proportional is payed on the
basis of qualifying years and the total amount of contribution.
The aging society with the low birth rate makes worse the balance of pension account in
the near future with the prolonged deationary economy in Japan. Japanese government has
announced every ve years the actuarial valuation of pension plan for 100 years, as seen [5] and
[6]. It reviewed the long term nancial viability under signicant changes in the demographic and
economical environment. In 2014, the new actuarial valuation of pension plan has been reviewed
in policy alternatives, so called, Macro-economic slide adjustment where premium is increased
and benet is decreased in order to keep the reserve to a certain viable level for 100 years. The
demographic scenario is seen in Table 1 where life expectancy is improved and fertility decreases
in about 40 years. Economic scenarios for the simulation are set for the ination rate, the rate of
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Table 1: Population projections
wage change, and the rate of return of investment as Table 2. The previous actuarial valuation
is xed ination as 1 % as government policy. However, the new valuation assumes it from 2.0%
which is the recent target number of Bank of Japan, to 0.6% of near-deation scenario. In the
bottom of Table 2, we see the stopping year of Macro-economic slide adjustment which means
premium increase and benet cut.
$\dagger$
After the stopping year, benets follow ination adjustment.
In the good economic performance cases except scenario $H$ , the premium and benet adjustment
nish within 30 years. In the scenario $H$ the reserve is used up in National pension. How to
avoid this situation of National pension is the main purpose of this paper.
The objective of the Macro-economic slide is to ensure the 100 years viability of public
pension. However, the macro-economic slide policy is not complete guarantee of 100 years
viability. It will increase the number of younger generation to refuse premium contribution due
to the distrust to pension system. However, the public pension has a huge reserve, namely 130
trillion yen and also the half amount of benet in fundamental pension is received as government
subsidy. Our goal of paper is to examine the conditions of parameters for the viability of public
penslon.
The structure of paper is as follows. In section 2 we explain the Japanese two-tier pension
system and describe the mathematical notations. In section 3 the cohort model of population
is introduced in order to include the criteria of generation equality. Section 4 is the viability
conditions for National pension. Last section is some concluding remarks.
2 Two-tier public pension
In the pension contract, policy holders pay premium from age $\omega_{1}$ to age $\omega_{2}$ and they receive
benet from age $\omega_{2}+1$ to the end age $\omega_{3}$ . The two-tier pension premium and benet are
depicted in Figure 1. The rst-tier of pension is compulsory and the premium and benet are
xed constants for all policy holders of National pension (NP). Let the constant pension premium
$\dagger$
The policy forces the premium rate $a_{t}$ increases up to the xed year $T_{a}$ as follows,
$a_{t}=\{\begin{array}{ll}a_{t-1}(1+m_{a}) , t<T_{a}a_{\max)} t\geq T_{a}\end{array}$
The policy forces to cut benet rate $b_{t}$ up to stoping time $\tau_{p}$ in order to keep the reserve level;
$b_{t}=\{\begin{array}{ll}b_{t-1}(1-m_{b}) , 0<t<\tau_{p}b_{7nin}, \tau_{p}\leq t\leq T\end{array}$
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Table 2: Economic scenarios
be $\alpha_{t}^{0}$ and the population of contributors be $\xi_{t}^{0}$ . The NP contribution equals $\alpha_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{0}$ . The second-
tier pension is called as Proportional pension (PP), where the premium is wage proportional
and it is payed by employees and the employer; Let the wage proportional premium ratio be $a_{t},$
the average wage be $H_{t}^{0}$ and the numbers of contributors be $\xi_{t}^{1}$ . The premium equals to $a_{t}H_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{1}.$
The total of two premiums at time $t$ is the sum as follows;
$u_{t}=\alpha_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{0}+a_{t}H_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{1}$
The benets are also depicted in the negative part of Figure 1. The box area below zero is
called fundamental pension benet which is the same value for all pensioners. The total of all
pensioners is $\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi^{4}$ , where $\xi_{t}^{2}$ is the population of NP pensioners at $t$ . Let $\alpha_{t}^{1}$ be the benet
amount per pensioner and then the benet of fundamental pension equals $\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})$ .
Let proportional pension benet ratio be $b_{t}$ and let $H_{t}^{1}$ be the average of premium paid at $t$
before age $\omega_{2}$ . Let $\xi_{t}^{3}$ be the population of PP pensioners and $\xi_{t}^{4}$ be the population of spouse of
PP pensioners. Total benet is the following sum;
$s_{t}=\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})+b_{t}H_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{3}$
Numbers of contributors and beneciaries in National pension at $t$ are given by
Figure 1: Premium and benet balance in two-tier Pension
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$\xi_{t}^{0}=\sum_{y=\omega_{1}}^{2}p_{n}(t, y)\omega, \xi_{t}^{2}=\sum_{y^{=\omega}2}^{\omega 3}p_{n}(t, y)$ .
Numbers of contributors and beneciaries in Proportional pension at $t$ are also given by
$\xi_{t}^{1}=\sum_{y=\omega_{1}}^{\omega_{2}}p_{p}(t, y) , \xi_{t}^{3}=\sum_{y=\omega_{2}}^{\omega_{3}}p_{p}(t, y)$
where $p(t, y)$ is the numbers of population at time $t$ of age $y$ . Let $l_{t}^{p}$ be the rate of Proportional
pension participation and $l_{t}^{0}$ be no policy holder rate. Let $p_{n}(t, y)=(1-l_{t}^{p}-l_{t}^{0})p(t, y)$ be numbers
of the National pension policyholders at $t$ of age $y$ . The numbers of the Proportional pension
policyholders is $p_{p}(t, y)=l_{t}^{p}p(t, y)$ . The period of premium payment is dened as $L=\omega_{2}-\omega_{1}.$
The rst tier balance is dened as follows;
$q_{t}^{n}(\alpha^{0}, \alpha^{1}):=\alpha_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{0}-\alpha_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{2}$
The second tier balance is dened as
$q_{t}^{p}(a, b, \alpha) :=u_{t}^{p}-s_{t}^{p}=H_{t}^{0}a_{t}\xi_{t}^{1}-(b_{t}H_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{3}+\alpha_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{3}+\alpha_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{4})$
Thus we dene the balance of 2-tier pension as
$q_{t}(a, b_{\rangle}\alpha):=u_{t}-s_{t}=q_{t}^{n}(\alpha^{0}, \alpha^{1})+q_{t}^{p}(a, b, \alpha)$ .
We dene the total asset value of pension as follows,
$W_{t}=R_{t}+q_{t}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})$ , (2.1)
where the government subsidy to each pensioner is $\beta_{t}.$
Let $R_{t}$ is the reserve at $t$ which is invested to a risky asset $A_{t}$ The stochastic processes of rate
of return of risky asset price $A_{t}$ is assumed as the following process;
$dr_{t}:= \frac{dA_{t}}{A_{t}}=\mu_{t}^{r}dt+\sigma_{t}^{r}dB_{t}^{r}$
where $B_{t}$ is a Brownian motion. For discretization let the increment be $\triangle r_{t}=\Delta A_{t}/A_{t}$ . Wage
process $H_{t}$ is assumed similarly,
$dx_{t}:= \frac{dH_{t}}{H_{t}}=\mu_{t}^{x}dt+\sigma_{x}^{r}dB_{t}^{x}$
The values of National pension and Wage-proportional pension are dened as follows,
$W_{t}^{n} = R_{t}^{n}+q_{t}^{n}(\alpha^{0}, \alpha^{1})+\beta_{t}\xi_{t}^{2}$ (2.2)
$W_{t}^{p} = R_{t}^{n}+q_{t}^{p}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t}\xi_{t}^{3}+\beta_{t}\xi_{t}^{4}$ (2.3)
Clearly $W_{t}=W_{t}^{n}+W_{t}^{p}.$
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2.1 Economic criteria for public pension
The objectives of public pension are redistribution of income to elders and self help for old
age. The performance of the objective in the redistribution of income to elders is measured by
\Income replacement ratio \ which should be more than some constant e.g.50%. The denition
of income replacement for wage proportional pension is average ratio benet over income after
premlum as,
$\frac{H_{t}^{1}b_{t}+\alpha_{t}^{1}}{H_{t}^{0}(1-a_{t})}>0.50$ (2.4)
The condition of self help for old age is economic rationality which mean that the present value
of pension should be positive. Let $\delta_{t}$ be discount function of time $t$ . The Expected value of
discount value to join National pension should be positive as,
$E[- \sum_{t=\omega_{1}}^{2}\alpha_{t}^{0}\delta_{t}+\sum_{t=\omega_{2}}^{3}\alpha_{t}^{1}\delta_{t}]\omega\omega>0$ (2.5)
The Expected value of discount value to join Wage-proportional pension should be
$E[- \sum_{t=\omega_{1}}^{\omega^{2}}a_{t}H_{t}^{0}\delta_{t}+\sum_{t=\omega_{2}}^{3}(b_{t}H_{t}^{1}\omega+\alpha_{t}^{1})\delta_{t}]>0$ (2.6)
2.2 Viability condition for two-tier pension
We consider the pension policy $\{a_{t}, b_{t}, \alpha_{t}^{0}, \alpha_{t}^{1}, \sqrt{}t\}$ which should satisfy the following conditions;
The rst is that the benet of Basic pension should be more than social welfare benet, which
is supported by government expenditure. If the condition is not satised, it causes hesitation
to pay the premium of National pension. Let $\sqrt{}\wedge$ be the social welfare benet $\rangle$ the benet of
National pension should satises the constraint;
$\alpha_{t}^{1}>\sqrt{}\wedge$ (2.7)
We dene the viability for each pension of two-tier system;
(i) For National pension account, the wealth is greater than the benet payment;
$W_{t}^{n}\geq\alpha_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{2}$ (2.8)
(ii) For Proportional pension account, similarly,
$W_{t}^{p}\geq\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})+b_{t}H_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{3}$ (2.9)
(iii) For the total account of public pension, the sum of two-tier should be satised as,
$W_{t}\geq s_{t}$ (2.10)
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2.3 PAYG scheme and default of pension
The objective of actuarial valuation is to prevent the shortage of reserve for benet. But in the
case when reserve is exhausted, the pension system moves to PAYG scheme. Then the all policy
variables are decided by the following conditions;
(i) For National pension, from $\alpha_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{0}-\alpha_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{2}+\beta_{t}\xi_{t}^{2}=0$ , the benet is proportional for population
ratio of contributors and pensioners;
$\alpha_{t}^{1}=\alpha_{t}^{0}\frac{\xi_{t}^{0}}{\xi_{t}^{2}}+\beta_{t}$
The benet should be larger than the social welfare from the condition (2.7), then the premium
should be larger than the product of population ratio; $*_{\xi_{t}}^{\xi^{0}}$ and the dierence of scal burden
between the social welfare and pension subsidy; $\sqrt{}\wedge-\beta_{t}.$
$\alpha_{t}^{0}>\frac{\xi_{t}^{2}}{\xi_{t}^{0}}(\hat{\beta}-\beta_{t})$
(ii) The balance of PAYG for the Proportional pension account should be positive;
$a_{t}H_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{1}-\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})-b_{f}H_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{3}+\beta_{t}(\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})\geq 0$
Then the benet ratio satises;
$b_{t} \leq_{tH_{t}^{1}}^{\alpha_{t}^{0}-\beta_{t}}a\frac{H_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{1}}{H_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{3}}-\frac{\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4}}{\xi_{t}^{3}}.$
In the case where the income substitution rate is 0.5, $\frac{b_{t}H_{t}^{1}+\alpha_{t}^{1}}{(1-a_{t})H_{t}^{0}}\geq 1/2$ , then the rate of benet
satises the following condition.
$b_{t} \geq\frac{1}{2}(1-a_{t})\frac{H_{t}^{0}}{H_{t}^{1}}-\frac{\alpha_{t}^{1}}{H_{t}^{1}}$
3 Cohort and population dynamics
The population is a function of age $y$ and time $t$ which satised McKendrick-von Foerster PDE
$\frac{\partial p(t,y)}{\partial t}=-\frac{\partial p(t,y)}{\partial y}-\mu(t, y)p(t, y)$
where $\mu(t, y)$ is the death rate of age $y$ at time $t,$ . Let $k$ $:=t-y,$ $v(k, y)=p(t, y)$ , then $v(k, y)$
implies the $k$-cohort population age $y$ . The PDE is simplied as
$dv(k, y)=-\mu(k, y)v(k, y)dy.$
Thus $k$-cohort population can be obtained in the discrete modeling as follows,
$v(k, y)=v(k, 0) \exp(-\sum_{s=0}^{y}\mu(k, s))$ (3.1)
The boundary condition is for given $m(k, y)$ which is the fertility rate of $k$-cohort and age $y.$
$v(k, 0)= \sum_{y=0}^{\omega_{3}}m(k-y, y)v(k-y, y)$
The explicit solution has been given in Feller[2], however the numerical simulation uses the
estimated value $\mu(k, y)$ in discrete time.
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3.1 The three groups of cohorts
There exists three groups of cohort. At rst we dene Planning groups of cohort whose all
premium and benet are determined within the planning period $t\in(0, T)$ Secondly we dene
Future group of cohort whose premium and benet cannot determined within the end of planning
year $T$ . Finally we dene Existing group of cohort whose premium and benet are determined
in before the planning time O. The value cannot be control to attain the optimality.
In Figure 2 we depict three groups in age-axis and time-axis. The age starts from $0$ and $\omega_{1}$ of
starting premium payment. The time starts from $0$ where 0-th cohort starts premium payment.
The planning period is assumed to be $t\in(0, T)$ . Let dene $T_{l}$ $:=T-(\omega_{3}-\omega_{1})$ $0$-cohort starts
paying of premium and $T_{l}$-cohort will nish all benet witch is seen in highest diagonal line in
Figure 2.
Planning cohort group is marked as $\mathcal{N}$ where the cohort $k$ satises $0\leq k\leq T_{l}$ . In the group
of cohorts, all policy variables $a_{t},$ $b_{t}$ are determined in panning period $0$ to $T$ . Future cohort
group is marked as $\mathcal{F}$ where the cohort $k$ satises $T_{l}+1\leq k\leq T$ . For the period $t=y+k\geq T$
$\tilde{a}_{t},$
$\tilde{b}_{t}$ is beyond of the planning period. Existing cohort group is marked as where the cohort
$k$ satises $-\omega_{3}\leq k\leq-1$ . The past xed parameters $a_{t}^{c},$ $b_{t}^{c}$ is eective for the group.
3.2 The net present value of pension for cohort groups
The economic rationality of pension has been discussed in section 1.3. The same condition should
be satised for each group of cohorts. The net present value of planning cohort $(O\leq k\leq T_{l})$ is
dened as follows, $\ddagger$
$c_{n}(k) :=f(a_{t}, b_{t}, \alpha_{t}^{0}, \alpha_{t}^{1})$ (3.2)
$100years$




$f(a_{t}, b_{t}, \alpha_{t}^{0}, \alpha_{t}^{1}) := -\sum_{y=\omega_{1}}^{\omega 2^{-1}}(\alpha_{y+k}^{0}v(k, y)\delta_{y+k}+a_{y+k}H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y))$
$+ \sum_{y_{2}^{=\omega}}^{\omega_{3}}(\alpha_{y+k}^{1}v(k, y)\delta_{y+k}+b_{y+k}H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y))$
and $H_{t}^{*}=H_{t}\delta_{t}.$
The net present value of future cohort $(T_{l}<k<T)$ is dened by denoting the following nota-











Then the net present value of future cohort is dened as follows,
$c_{f}(k)=f(\^{a}_{t},\hat{b}_{t},\hat{\alpha}_{t}^{0},\hat{\alpha}_{t}^{1})$ (3.3)
The net present value of existing cohort $(-\omega_{3}\leq k\leq-1)$ is dened by denoting the fol-
lowing notations; The policy variables which existed already are the following past $parameters_{\rangle}.$
$a_{c},$










Then the net present value of future cohort is dened as follows,
$c_{p}(k)=f(\hat{a}_{t},\hat{b}_{t},\hat{\alpha}_{t}^{0},\hat{\alpha}_{t}^{1})$ (3.4)
The past policy variables $a_{c},$ $b_{c},$ $\alpha_{c}^{0},$ $\alpha_{c}^{1}$ are constants. And the future policy variables $\tilde{a}_{y+k},$ $\tilde{b}_{y+k},$ $\tilde{\alpha}_{y+k}^{0},$ $\tilde{\alpha}_{y+k}^{1}$
also assumed to be constant and not policy variables.
The economic condition for cohort groups is the positivity of expected net present value
under risk neutral measure $Q$ . For all cohort which belongs to Planning group the expected
value should be positive as
$E^{Q}[c_{7l}(k)|\mathcal{F}_{k}]>0,$ $0\leq k\leq T_{l}$ (3.5)
For all cohort which belongs to Future groupthe expected value should be positive as
$E^{Q}[c_{f}(k)|\mathcal{F}_{k}]>0,$ $T_{l}<k<T$ (3.6)
For all cohort which belongs to Existing group the expected value should be positive as
$E^{Q}[c_{p}(k)|\mathcal{F}_{k}]>0,$ $-\omega_{3}\leq k\leq-1$ (3.7)
3.3 Evaluation of objective performance
We consider two evaluation approach for measure the goodness of policy selection. The rst is
focus on only the planning cohorts, because all parameter are indigenous and it is less inuential
from past policy decision.
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Let $U(\cdot)$ be the utility function for planning groups. The objective function are considered
discounted sum of the utility function over all cohorts of the planning group as;
$\max_{a_{t)}b_{t},\alpha,\beta}E[\sum_{k=0}^{T_{l}}\delta_{k}U(c_{\eta}(k))]$ (3.8)
The second which we consider is to minimize the variance of present value of pension for
cohorts. It may be an equity policy for generations. Let $m$ be the average of net present values
for all cohorts as,
$m= \frac{1}{\omega_{3}+T}\sum_{3k=-\omega}^{T}c(k)$
We choose the policy $\{a_{t}, b_{t}, \alpha, \beta\}_{t=1,\cdots,T}$ in order to minimize the variance of net present
values,
$\min_{a_{t)}b_{t},\alpha,\beta}\sum_{k=-\omega_{3}}^{T}(c(k)-m)^{2}$ (3.9)
4 Viability conditions to policy variables
The economic factors and population are stochastic processes. The former changes with a
signicant volatility but the later changes slowly and steadily. The critical problem for pension
is fear of default, however there is no default if we adopt the PAYG policy but it will worsen
the income replacement ratio.
The viability of pension is dened in (2.8),(2.9) and (2.10) which implies the positivity of
reserve after the payment of benets for stochastic change in economic factors. We consider the
problem similar to the optimal investment and consumption problem, which has been formulated
in [3], In this paper we reformulate for discretized conditions. This viability condition reduces
the numbers of free variables to numerical calculation.
4.1 Stochastic process of asset value of pensions
4.1.1 The process for National pension
The dynamics of $W_{t}^{n}$ is from (2.2),
$\Delta W_{t}^{n}=R_{t}^{n}\Delta r_{t}+\triangle q_{t}^{n}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t}\triangle\xi_{t}^{2}$ (4.1)
The wealth process $W_{t+1}^{n}=W_{t}^{n}+\Delta W_{t}^{n}$ is determined by new policy parameters of premium
and benet $\alpha_{t+1}^{0},$ $\alpha_{t+1}^{1}$ . From this self nancing condition the wealth at $t+1$ satises as follows,
$W_{t+1}^{n} = R_{t}^{n}(1+\triangle r_{t})+\alpha_{t}^{0}(\xi_{t}^{0}+\Delta\xi_{t}^{0})-\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\Delta\xi_{t}^{2})+\beta_{t}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\Delta\xi_{t}^{2})$
$= R_{t+1}+\alpha_{t+1}^{0}\xi_{t+1}^{0}-\alpha_{t+1}^{1}\xi_{t+1}^{2}+\beta_{t+1}^{n}\xi_{t+1}^{2}$
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4.1.2 The process for wage-proportional pension
The dynamics of value of proportional pension follows
$dW_{t}^{p}=R_{t}^{p}dr_{t}+dq_{t}^{p}(a, b_{\rangle}\alpha)+\sqrt{}t(d\xi_{t}^{3}+d\xi_{t}^{4})$ (4.2)
where $dq_{t}^{p}=a_{t}(dH_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{1}+H_{t}^{0}d\xi_{t}^{1})-(b_{t}H_{t}^{1}d\xi_{t}^{3}+\alpha_{t}^{1}d\xi_{t}^{3}+\alpha_{t}^{1}d\xi_{t}^{4})$ .
From $dH_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{1}+H_{t}^{0}d\xi_{t}^{1}=H_{t}^{0}(dx_{t}+d\xi_{t}^{1})$ where $dH_{t}^{0}/H_{t}^{0}=dx_{t}.$
$q_{t+dt}^{p}(a, b, \alpha) = a_{t}H_{t}^{0}(1+d\xi_{t}^{1}+dx_{t})-(b_{t}H_{t}^{1}(1+d\xi_{t}^{3})+\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{3}+d\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4}+d\xi_{t}^{4}))$
New policy for premium rate and benet rates $a_{t+dt},$ $b_{t+dt}$ becomes from self nancing condition;
$W_{t+dt}^{p}=R_{t+dt}^{p}+q_{t+dt}^{p}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t+dt}(\xi_{t+dt}^{3}+\xi_{t+dt}^{4})$
4.1.3 The total wealth of two-tier pension
The total wealth of two-tier pension is the sum of the values as,
$W_{t}=W_{t}^{p}+W_{t}^{n}$
where the sum of balances of the NP and PP is
$q_{t}(a, b, \alpha):=\alpha_{t}^{0}\xi_{t}^{0}+H_{t}^{0}a_{t}\xi_{t}^{1}-(b_{t}H_{t}^{1}\xi_{t}^{3}+\alpha_{t}^{1}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4}))$
and the government subsidy $\beta_{t}(\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})$ .
The dynamics of wealth process for total pension follows as
$dW_{t}=R_{t}dr_{t}+dq_{t}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t}d(\xi_{t}^{2}+\xi_{t}^{3}+\xi_{t}^{4})$
The new policy $\beta_{t+dt}$ of self nancing condition $satises_{\rangle}$
$W_{t+dt} = R_{t+dt}+q_{t+dt}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t+dt}(\xi_{t+dt}^{2}+\xi_{t+dt}^{3}+\xi_{t+dt}^{4})$
4.2 Viability condition for National pension
From (4.1) the wealth change of National pension satises,
$\triangle W_{t}^{n} = R_{t}^{n}\triangle r_{t}+\triangle q_{t}^{n}(a, b, \alpha)+\beta_{t}\triangle\xi_{t}^{2}$
$= \frac{R_{t}^{n}}{A_{t}}\triangle A_{t}+\alpha_{t}^{0}\triangle\xi_{t}^{0}-(\alpha_{t}^{1}-\beta_{t})\Delta\xi_{t}^{2}$
We take the discounted values which are denoted with $*$ as $W_{t}^{n*}:=W_{t}^{n}\delta_{t},$ $A_{t}^{*}:=A_{t}\delta_{t},$ $\beta_{t}^{*}=\beta_{t}\delta_{t}.$
Denote the amount of market asset be $\delta_{t}=e^{-\Sigma_{i=0}^{t}r_{i}^{f}}$ , where $r_{i}^{f}$ is the risk free rate and $\phi_{t}=\frac{R_{t}^{\eta}}{A_{t}}.$
$\triangle W_{t}^{n*}=\phi_{t}\triangle A_{t}^{*}+\delta_{t}(\alpha_{t}^{0}\triangle\xi_{t}^{0}-(\alpha_{t}^{1}-\beta_{t})\triangle\xi_{t}^{2})$
Then the wealth could divide martingale part $M_{t}$ and the others $N_{t}$ as,
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Under a risk neutral probability $Q,$ $M_{t}$ is $Q$-martingale. From $M_{t}=E_{t}^{Q}[M_{T}]=E_{t}^{Q}[W_{T}^{*}-N_{T}]$
we obtain as
$W_{t}^{n*}=M_{t}+N_{t}=E_{t}^{Q}[W_{T}^{n*}-N_{T}+N_{t}]$
Therefore, by substituting $N_{t}$ the following equation is derived;
$W_{t}^{n*}=E_{t}^{Q}[W_{T}^{n*}- \sum_{s=t}^{T-1}(\alpha_{s}^{0_{\Delta-}}\xi_{s}^{0}(\alpha_{s}^{1}-\beta_{s})\triangle\xi_{s}^{2})\delta_{s}]$
where $W_{0}^{n}=R_{0}^{n}.$
The terminal condition satises
$W_{T}^{n}=s_{T}^{n}=(\alpha_{T}^{1}-\beta_{T})\xi_{T}^{2}$ . (4.3)
In oder to guarantee $W_{T-1}^{n}\geq 0$ , it is necessary to have the following condition;
$W_{T-1}^{n}=E_{T-1}^{Q}[s_{T}^{n}-(\alpha_{T-1}^{0}\triangle\xi_{T-1}^{0}-(\alpha_{T-1}^{1}-\beta_{T-1})\Delta\xi_{T-1}^{2})]\geq 0$
Because $\alpha^{0},$ $\alpha^{1}$ is predictable and the assumption of deterministic population change, at time
$T-1$ it is simplied as follows,
$W_{T-1}^{n}=(\alpha_{T}^{1}-\sqrt{}\tau)\xi_{T}^{2}+(\alpha_{T-1}^{1}-\beta_{T-1})\triangle\xi_{T-1}^{2}-\alpha_{T-1}^{0}\Delta\xi_{T-1}^{0}\geq 0$




where $W_{0}^{n}=R_{0}^{n}$ . Consequently,
$E^{Q}[W_{1}^{n}]=R_{0}^{n}-(\alpha_{1}^{1}-\beta_{1})\triangle\xi_{1}^{2}+\alpha_{1}^{0}\triangle\xi_{1}^{0}\geq 0$
for $j\in(2, T-1)$ using the chain rule of conditional expectation;
$E^{Q}[W_{j}^{n}]=R_{0^{-\sum_{i=1}^{j}i}}^{n}\{(\alpha_{i}^{1}-\sqrt{})\triangle\xi_{i}^{2}-\alpha_{i}^{0}\Delta\xi_{i}^{0}\}\geq 0$
and for $T$ ;
$E^{Q}[W_{T}^{n}]=R_{0}^{n}- \sum_{i=1}^{T-1}\{(\alpha_{i}^{1}-\beta_{i})\triangle\xi_{\iota'}^{2}-\alpha_{i}^{0}\triangle\xi_{i}^{0}\}-(\alpha_{T}^{1}-\beta_{T})\xi_{T}^{2}\geq 0$
The positivity conditions of value of pension are the constraints where the positivity of initial
reserved minus the change of value due to the numbers of policy holders.
42
5 Concluding remarks
The optimal selection of premium and benet are depending very long time schedule. In this
paper we try to nd them without direct parameter assumption as Macro-economic slide policy
which uses exponential decreasing assumption [5]. The strong assumption enable to calculate
numerically but it cannot give the viability of pension. In order to obtain the viable premium
and benet, we need rather simpler modeling than this two-tier pension system.
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